Looking for an answer to question, why some nations do better in terms of development and others don't many economists point to management of available resources. No doubt, a nation's decision about how to manage the available resources is main determinant of economic prosperity and well being of the citizens. RENT SEEKING is one of the phenomena that influence the resource management and its distributive effects in a country. In fact RENT SEEKING and the ensuing costs could be a substantial part of the puzzle that why some nations develop while the others lag behind or suffer underdevelopment. Given the fact that RENT SEEKING is crucial problem in Iran's economy, this study aims at presenting a new approach to an underlying determinant of underdevelopment in countries like Iran.

Background: The phenomenon of RENT-SEEKING is a historical phenomenon that has a long history. The main element of RENT-SEEKING is discrimination. And depending on whether this discrimination is fair or unfair, it is valued. RENT-SEEKING based on unfair discrimination is a clear example of corruption, and corruption is recognized as immoral and disgusting in the mind of every thinking person. Based on this, the present research has investigated the moral and criminological angles of RENT-SEEKING with a descriptive and analytical method. Conclusion: Most of the factors that cause RENT-SEEKING, including natural resource monopoly, weak structures and institutions, sanctions, authoritarian rule, cultural weakness, lack of transparency, etc., are all rooted in the moral structure of society. Unfortunately, in our society where moral corruption has been institutionalized, it is obvious that RENT-SEEKING is facing increasing growth and gradually affects various economic, political, social, cultural, administrative, etc. areas of the society. In addition, RENT-SEEKING in general has not been criminalized in our legal system. At the same time, one of the main duties and powers of governments is fighting corruption. And criminalization is one of the most important and sensitive tools to achieve this goal. Therefore, the non-use of such a tool to deal with and prevent RENT-SEEKING in Iran's legal system is questionable. Especially since the legal system based on Islamic thought is obliged to deal with the manifestations of corruption.

RENT-SEEKING is an effort that is formed between a company and its employees to obtain more profit under their tendency to RENT-SEEKING. In this paper, the interaction between a company and its employees is studied by an unlimited multi stage repeated games. According to the strategies of the company and its employees (payment and punishment types for RENT-seeker employee) subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) and their payoffs are obtained based on the history of game. Finally it will be shown that under what condition (the punishment and payment types), the employees do not choose the RENT-SEEKING strategies and behave honestly.

This article tends to analyze RENT SEEKING in Iran government budgeting. It aims at developing an analytical framework to help us increase our understanding of RENT SEEKING in public budgeting. In fact the paper focuses on political economy aspect of RENT SEEKING, and particularly on RENT SEEKING in government budgeting. The first section discusses RENT SEEKING in government budgeting based on the public choice theory. The next section considers the interaction between politicians and voters. The discussion will proceed by exploring and analyzing four interaction models between politicians and voters: Fiscal persuasion, fiscal exchange, fiscal compulsion and fiscal abstention. The last section presents the ways in which government budgetary actors and agents (i.e. voters, politicians, bureaucrats and pressure groups) take certain shares of the budget public resources. Furthermore, there is an analysis of the mechanism and processes that facilitate RENT SEEKING in public budgeting.

RENT SEEKING is a widely used word in our society that the frequency of its use indicates the prevalence of a type of behavior based on receiving illegitimate financial and non-financial benefits by exploiting the fields and factors of RENT, such as passing laws, granting licenses, creating monopolies and access to information. Whenever there is a restriction on competition, whether it is of a natural type, such as a limitation caused by natural resources, or an artificial type, such as monopolies caused by innovation or entry ban, it creates a kind of surplus income for the beneficiaries, which is called RENT in the economic literature. In other words, RENT is the additional income paid to the owner of resources or the owner of expertise, which is not the result of operating in a competitive market and is not entirely the result of an individual's effort or expertise. Therefore, it can be said that RENT is a kind of "privilege" resulting from non-competitive conditions, and RENT-SEEKING is also called the process of acquiring this privilege.This phenomenon has left many negative consequences at diffeRENT levels of the social system and from a criminological point of view, while weakening public morals and increasing corruption, it plays a significant role in the production and proliferation of economic and non-economic crimes, so it is considered a widespread pest and a serious warning for order and public security.The curRENT approach of Iran's legal system towards RENT SEEKING is based on situational prevention through methods such as dealing with the property of officials, creating job bans and restrictions on participation in government transactions, and also prevention and criminal confrontation through criminalization and punishment crimes related to RENT-SEEKING (such as bribery, money laundering and embezzlement); But the criminalization of RENT-SEEKING is a place of challenge and doubt. The justification or non-justification of the criminalization of RENT SEEKING depends on the evaluation of various factors to assessment the reprehensibility or harmfulness of this phenomenon, which is above all these factors, economic needs. The supremacy of economic principles in  assessment of criminalization of RENT SEEKING arose from the connection of RENT with the economic system. RENT, which is sometimes referred to as economic RENT, is defined by several definitions such as payment and exclusive privilege, and as in classical economics, it is a normal concept; In moral economy, it is considered an unpleasant concept. Therefore, in the way of criminalizing RENT SEEKING, it should be seen how much the phenomenon of RENT SEEKING is affected by its main platform, which is the economy, and in the meantime, the legal system as the guardian of the criminalization of reprehensible behaviors or harmful, what ratio does it establish between the economic factor and other factors.Starting to investigate the feasibility of criminalizing RENT SEEKING from an economic point of view is not only for the purpose of connecting the origin of RENT with the economy; Rather, the economic approach to criminalization and calculating the cost-benefits of determining the punishment for RENT SEEKING can distance the politician from emotional and rhetorical policies.The presentation of views related to the fight against RENT SEEKING and economic corruption and the necessity of a decisive response to the corrupters is always tinged with politicization and sloganeering, which can cast a shadow on acceleration in criminalization. It is for this reason that despite the existence of various policies regarding dealing with RENT and numerous criminalization that have been carried out regarding all types of crimes related to RENT, we still witness the failure of these policies and the increase of RENT SEEKING in country. It seems that the antidote to such hasty policies is the logical arrangement of criminalization requirements along with each other, where economic requirements are placed higher than others in the face of RENT SEEKING.The economic approach is based on focus on not causing disruption in economic processes and its efficiency on the one hand and measuring the cost benefits of criminalization of RENT-SEEKING on the economy (and not other areas because measuring the cost benefits of criminalization in the field of other issues are raised in general criminalization and are not exclusive to RENT SEEKING.) and through the lens of these two indicators, it tries to show its share of justifying the criminalization of RENT SEEKING as an independent crime.The main issue of this article is whether the criminalization of RENT can be justified from the point of view of economic needs, so that it is time to examine other bases and needs (such as moral, social and political bases) or not? From an economic point of view, the criminalization of RENT SEEKING faces two main challenges and one secondary challenge.In the first main challenge, this issue is raised that the criminalization of RENT SEEKING leads to the control of economic activities and the ordering of the management or organization of the economy in macro dimensions, in such a way that the control of privileges, even if exclusive, can cause The free path of the economy will be lost. In fact, with the criminalization of RENT, the government's RENT economy will move from the side of the executive power to the control economy of the judiciary, and nothing will change in practice. The second main challenge considers the criminalization of RENT-SEEKING from the perspective of a relative phenomenon whose positive and negative meanings are intertwined in the economy and cannot be demarcated. The sub-challenge looks at the criminalization of RENT from the perspective of normative economics, based on which, its border with economic and financial corruption is not clear and does not have the characteristics of an independent criminal phenomenon.as a result, from the perspective of criminology and accurate knowledge of the causes of delinquency, it can be associated with challenges.Using library sources and by the method of description and analysis, this article has reached the conclusion that the economic approach to the criminalization of RENT-SEEKING is ultimately positive, and according to the factor responsible for the economy, which is the main source and also the economic consequences of RENT-SEEKING, this phenomenon should be criminalized. However, the necessity of freedom and competitiveness in economical activities should be considered as a negative criterion in the criminalization. Therefore, instead of focusing on economic activities it is suggested that in the criminalization of RENT-SEEKING, the position, motivation and activities of the economic operator should be the center of the criminalization.

Background and Aim: RENT-SEEKING is one of the manifestations of corruption, the effects of which are very significant in the field of economics. The present study seeks to investigate the effect of RENT-SEEKING on economics from a jurisprudential perspective. Materials and Methods: The method used in the present study is the analysis of criminal content and reference to jurisprudential texts, legal documents, articles and research written in this field. Ethical considerations: The present study has been written based on ethical principles in referring to and using jurisprudential sources and first-hand texts. Results: Bribery has a variety of information, economic, political, social, educational, judicial and security RENTs and is a manifestation of oppression and corruption due to providing access to some and depriving others. In jurisprudence, practical RENT-SEEKING has been declared ugly and forbidden. Conclusion: Economic prosperity requires productive work and effort and avoidance of methods that allow some to access the benefits and deprive others. For this reason, RENT causes inequality, oppression, as well as the formation of mafia gangs of wealth and power. Islamic jurisprudence opposes illegitimate amassing wealth, including RENTSEEKING.

Weak economic performance that has been observed in countries with rich natural resources is called resource curse. There have been many studies on resource curse, especially the adverse effects of this phenomenon on economic growth. Income inequality or unfair distribution of income is one of the main characteristics of resource rich countries. But, there has not been much research on the effect of resource curse on income inequality. The focus of this study is on the countries that are rich in oil and empirical study has been done for 16 countries. The purpose of this research is an analysis of the effect of oil incomes on income inequality for these countries. We find that oil incomes have reduced income inequality in countries with better governance. RENT-SEEKING could explain the adverse effect of oil incomes on income inequality. Our empirical results are consistent with this contention, because the index of RENT-SEEKING has an adverse and significant effect on income distribution as measured by Gini coefficient.